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Abstract
About a symmetric three-players zero-sum game we will show the following results.
1. A modified version of Sion’s minimax theorem with the coincidence of the max-
imin strategy and theminimax strategy are proved by the existence of a symmetric
Nash equilibrium.
2. The existence of a symmetric Nash equilibrium is proved by the modified version
of Sion’s minimax theorem with the coincidence of the maximin strategy and the
minimax strategy.
Thus, they are equivalent. If a zero-sum game is asymmetric, maximin strategies and
minimax strategies of players do not correspond to Nash equilibrium strategies. If it is
symmetric, the maximin strategies and the minimax strategies constitute a Nash equi-
librium. However, without the coincidence of the maximin strategy and the minimax
strategy there may exist an asymmetric equilibrium in a symmetric three-players zero-
sum game.
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1 Introduction
We consider the relation between Sion’s minimax theorem for a continuous function and the
existence of Nash equilibrium in a symmetric three-players zero-sum game. We will show
the following results.
1. A modified version of Sion’s minimax theorem with the coincidence of the maximin
strategy and the minimax strategy are proved by the existence of a symmetric Nash
equilibrium.
2. The existence of a symmetric Nash equilibrium is proved by the modified version of
Sion’s minimax theorem with the coincidence of the maximin strategy and the mini-
max strategy.
Thus, they are equivalent. However, without the coincidence of themaximin strategy and the
minimax strategy there may exist an asymmetric equilibrium in a symmetric three-players
zero-sum game.
An example of such a game is a relative profit maximization game in a Cournot oligopoly.
Suppose that there are three firms, A, B and C in an oligopolistic industry. Let ̄𝜋𝐴, ̄𝜋𝐵 and ̄𝜋𝐶
be the absolute profits of the firms. Then, their relative profits are
𝜋𝐴 = ̄𝜋𝐴 −
1
2( ̄𝜋𝐵 + ̄𝜋𝐶), 𝜋𝐵 = ̄𝜋𝐵 −
1
2( ̄𝜋𝐴 + ̄𝜋𝐶), 𝜋𝐶 = ̄𝜋𝐶 −
1
2( ̄𝜋𝐵 + ̄𝜋𝐶).
We see
𝜋𝐴 + 𝜋𝐵 + 𝜋𝐶 = ̄𝜋𝐴 + ̄𝜋𝐵 + ̄𝜋𝐶 − ( ̄𝜋𝐴 + ̄𝜋𝐵 + ̄𝜋𝐶) = 0.
Thus, the relative profit maximization game in a Cournot oligopoly is a zero-sum game1.
If the oligopoly is asymmetric because the demand function is not symmetric (in a case of
differentiated goods) or firms have different cost functions (in both homogeneous and differ-
entiated goods cases), maximin strategies and minimax strategies of firms do not correspond
to Nash equilibrium strategies. However, if the demand function is symmetric and the firms
have the same cost function, the maximin strategies and the minimax strategies constitute a
Nash equilibrium.
2 The model and Sion’s minimax theorem
Consider a symmetric three-players zero-sum game. There are three players, A, B and C.
The strategic variables for Players A, B and C are, respectively, 𝑠𝐴, 𝑠𝐵, 𝑠𝐶 , and (𝑠𝐴, 𝑠𝐵, 𝑠𝐶) ∈
𝑆𝐴 × 𝑆𝐵 × 𝑆𝐶 . 𝑆𝐴, 𝑆𝐵 and 𝑆𝐶 are convex and compact sets in linear topological spaces. The
payoff function of each player is 𝑢𝑖(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠𝐵, 𝑠𝐶), 𝑖 = 𝐴, 𝐵, 𝐶 . We assume
𝑢𝐴, 𝑢𝐵 and 𝑢𝐶 are continuous on 𝑆𝐴 × 𝑆𝐵 × 𝑆𝐶 , quasi-concave on 𝑆𝑖 for each
𝑠𝑗 ∈ 𝑆𝑗 , 𝑗 ≠ 𝑖, and quasi-convex on 𝑆𝑗 for 𝑗 ≠ 𝑖 for each 𝑠𝑖 ∈ 𝑆𝑖 , 𝑖 = 𝐴, 𝐵, 𝐶 .
1About relative profit maximization under imperfect competition please see Matsumura, Matsushima and
Cato (2013), Satoh and Tanaka (2013), Satoh and Tanaka (2014a), Satoh and Tanaka (2014b), Tanaka
(2013a), Tanaka (2013b) and Vega-Redondo (1997)
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Symmetry of a gamemeans that the payoff functions of the players are symmetric, and in the
payoff function of each Player 𝑖, Players 𝑗 and 𝑘, 𝑗, 𝑘 ≠ 𝑖, are interchangeable. If the game is
symmetric and zero-sum, we have
𝑢𝐴(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠𝐵, 𝑠𝐶) + 𝑢𝐵(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠𝐵, 𝑠𝐶) + 𝑢𝐶(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠𝐵, 𝑠𝐶) = 0, (1)
for given (𝑠𝐴, 𝑠𝐵, 𝑠𝐶). Also 𝑆𝐴, 𝑆𝐵 and 𝑆𝐶 are identical. Denote them by 𝑆.
Sion’s minimax theorem (Sion (1958), Komiya (1988), Kindler (2005)) for a continuous
function is stated as follows.
Lemma1. Let𝑋 and 𝑌 be non-void convex and compact subsets of two linear topological spaces,
and let 𝑓 ∶ 𝑋 × 𝑌 → ℝ be a function that is continuous and quasi-concave in the first variable
and continuous and quasi-convex in the second variable. Then
max𝑥∈𝑋 min𝑦∈𝑌 𝑓 (𝑥, 𝑦) = min𝑦∈𝑌 max𝑥∈𝑋 𝑓 (𝑥, 𝑦).
We follow the description of this theorem in Kindler (2005).
When 𝑠𝐶 is given, 𝑢𝐴(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠𝐵, 𝑠𝐶) is a function of 𝑠𝐴 and 𝑠𝐵. We can apply Lemma 1 to such
a situation, and get the following equation
max𝑠𝐴∈𝑆𝐴 min𝑠𝐵∈𝑆𝐵 𝑢𝐴(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠𝐵, 𝑠𝐶) = min𝑠𝐵∈𝑆𝐵 max𝑠𝐴∈𝑆𝐴 𝑢𝐴(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠𝐵, 𝑠𝐶) given 𝑠𝐶 . (2)
Now we assume
Assumption 1.
arg max𝑠𝐴∈𝑆𝐴 min𝑠𝐵∈𝑆𝐵 𝑢𝐴(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠𝐵, 𝑠𝐶) = arg min𝑠𝐵∈𝑆𝐵 max𝑠𝐴∈𝑆𝐴 𝑢𝐴(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠𝐵, 𝑠𝐶),
that is, the maximin strategy and the minimax strategy for Player A coincide given 𝑠𝐶 .
In (2) and this assumption Players A, B and C are mutually interchangeable.
Let 𝑠 be a value of 𝑠𝐶 . Consider the following function;
𝑠 → argmax𝑠𝐴∈𝑆 min𝑠𝐵∈𝑆 𝑢𝐴(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠𝐵, 𝑠).
Since 𝑢𝐴 is continuous and 𝑆 is compact, this function is also continuous. Thus, by the
Glicksberg fixed point theorem (Glicksberg (1952)) there exists a fixed point. Denote it by ̃𝑠.
̃𝑠 satisfies
argmax𝑠𝐴∈𝑆 min𝑠𝐵∈𝑆 𝑢𝐴(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠𝐵, ̃𝑠) = ̃𝑠.
Based on Assumption 1 we present a modified version of Sion’s minimax theorem.
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Lemma 2 (Modified version of Sion’s minimax theorem). Let 𝑆𝐴 and 𝑆𝐵 be non-void convex
and compact subsets of two linear topological spaces, and let 𝑢𝐴 ∶ 𝑆𝐴 × 𝑆𝐵 → ℝ given 𝑠𝐶 be
a function that is continuous on 𝑆𝐴 × 𝑆𝐵, quasi-concave on 𝑆𝐴 and quasi-convex on 𝑆𝐵. Then,
under Assumption 1 there exists 𝑠𝐶 = 𝑠 such that
max𝑠𝐴∈𝑆𝐴 min𝑠𝐵∈𝑆𝐵 𝑢𝐴(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠𝐵, 𝑠) = min𝑠𝐵∈𝑆𝐵 max𝑠𝐴∈𝑆𝐴 𝑢𝐴(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠𝐵, 𝑠).
and
arg max𝑠𝐴∈𝑆𝐴 min𝑠𝐵∈𝑆𝐵 𝑢𝐴(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠𝐵, 𝑠) = arg min𝑠𝐵∈𝑆𝐵 max𝑠𝐴∈𝑆𝐴 𝑢𝐴(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠𝐵, 𝑠) = 𝑠.
Weassume that argmax𝑠𝐴∈𝑆𝐴 min𝑠𝐵∈𝑆𝐵 𝑢𝐴(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠𝐵, 𝑠𝐶) and argmin𝑠𝐵∈𝑆𝐵 max𝑠𝐴∈𝑆𝐴 𝑢𝐴(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠𝐵, 𝑠𝐶)are unique, that is, single-valued. By the maximum theorem they are continuous in 𝑠𝐶 . Also,
throughout this paper we assume that the maximin strategy and the minimax strategy of
players in any situation are unique, and the best response of players in any situation is
unique.
3 The main results
Consider a Nash equilibrium of a symmetric three-players zero-sum game. Let 𝑠∗𝐴, 𝑠∗𝐵, 𝑠∗𝐶
be the values of 𝑠𝐴, 𝑠𝐵, 𝑠𝐶 which, respectively, maximize 𝑢𝐴 given 𝑠𝐵 and 𝑠𝐶 , maximize
𝑢𝐵 given 𝑠𝐴 and 𝑠𝐶 , maximize 𝑢𝐶 given 𝑠𝐴 and 𝑠𝐵, in a neighborhood around (𝑠∗𝐴, 𝑠∗𝐵, 𝑠∗𝐶) in
𝑆𝐴 × 𝑆𝐵 × 𝑆𝐶 = 𝑆3. Then,
𝑢𝐴(𝑠∗𝐴, 𝑠∗𝐵, 𝑠∗𝐶) ≥ 𝑢𝐴(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠∗𝐵, 𝑠∗𝐶) for all 𝑠𝐴 ≠ 𝑠∗𝐴,
𝑢𝐵(𝑠∗𝐴, 𝑠∗𝐵, 𝑠∗𝐶) ≥ 𝑢𝐵(𝑠∗𝐴, 𝑠𝐵, 𝑠∗𝐶) for all 𝑠𝐵 ≠ 𝑠∗𝐵,
𝑢𝐶(𝑠∗𝐴, 𝑠∗𝐵, 𝑠∗𝐶) ≥ 𝑢𝐶(𝑠∗𝐴, 𝑠∗𝐵, 𝑠𝐶) for all 𝑠𝐶 ≠ 𝑠∗𝐶 .
If the Nash equilibrium is symmetric,𝑠∗𝐴, 𝑠∗𝐵 and 𝑠∗𝐶 are equal at equilibria. Then, 𝑢𝐴(𝑠∗𝐴, 𝑠∗𝐵, 𝑠∗𝐶),
𝑢𝐵(𝑠∗𝐴, 𝑠∗𝐵, 𝑠∗𝐶) and 𝑢𝐶(𝑠∗𝐴, 𝑠∗𝐵, 𝑠∗𝐶) are equal, and by the property of zero-sumgame they are zero.
We show the following theorem.
Theorem 1. The existence of Nash equilibrium in a symmetric three-players zero-sum game
implies the modified version of Sion’s minimax theorem with the coincidence of the maximin
strategy and the minimax strategy at the symmetric Nash equilibrium.
Proof. 1. Let (𝑠∗𝐴, 𝑠∗𝐵, 𝑠∗𝐶) = (𝑠∗, 𝑠∗, 𝑠∗) be a symmetric Nash equilibrium of a three-players
zero-sum game. Then,
𝑢𝐴(𝑠∗, 𝑠∗, 𝑠∗) = max𝑠𝐴∈𝑆 𝑢𝐴(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠
∗, 𝑠∗) ≥ 𝑢𝐴(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠∗, 𝑠∗). (3)
Since the game is zero-sum,
𝑢𝐴(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠∗, 𝑠∗) + 𝑢𝐵(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠∗, 𝑠∗) + 𝑢𝐶(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠∗, 𝑠∗) = 0.
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By symmetry of the game
𝑢𝐴(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠∗, 𝑠∗) + 2𝑢𝐵(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠∗, 𝑠∗) = 0.
This means
𝑢𝐴(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠∗, 𝑠∗) = −2𝑢𝐵(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠∗, 𝑠∗).
This equation holds for any 𝑠𝐴. Thus,
argmax𝑠𝐴∈𝑆 𝑢𝐴(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠
∗, 𝑠∗) = argmin𝑠𝐴∈𝑆 𝑢𝐵(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠
∗, 𝑠∗) = 𝑠∗.
By the assumption of the uniqueness of the best responses, they are unique. By sym-
metry of the game,
argmax𝑠𝐴∈𝑆 𝑢𝐴(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠
∗, 𝑠∗) = argmin𝑠𝐵∈𝑆 𝑢𝐴(𝑠
∗, 𝑠𝐵, 𝑠∗) = 𝑠∗.
Therefore,
𝑢𝐴(𝑠∗, 𝑠∗, 𝑠∗) = min𝑠𝐵∈𝑆 𝑢𝐴(𝑠
∗, 𝑠𝐵, 𝑠∗) ≤ 𝑢𝐴(𝑠∗, 𝑠𝐵, 𝑠∗).
With (3), we get
max𝑠𝐴∈𝑆 𝑢𝐴(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠
∗, 𝑠∗) = 𝑢𝐴(𝑠∗, 𝑠∗, 𝑠∗) = min𝑠𝐵∈𝑆 𝑢𝐴(𝑠
∗, 𝑠𝐵, 𝑠∗).
This means
min𝑠𝐵∈𝑆 max𝑠𝐴∈𝑆 𝑢𝐴(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠𝐵, 𝑠
∗) ≤ max𝑠𝐴∈𝑆 𝑢𝐴(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠
∗, 𝑠∗) (4)
=min𝑠𝐵∈𝑆 𝑢𝐴(𝑠
∗, 𝑠𝐵, 𝑠∗) ≤ max𝑠𝐴∈𝑆 min𝑠𝐵∈𝑆 𝑢𝐴(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠𝐵, 𝑠
∗).
On the other hand, since
min𝑠𝐵∈𝑆 𝑢𝐴(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠𝐵, 𝑠
∗) ≤ 𝑢𝐴(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠𝐵, 𝑠∗),
we have
max𝑠𝐴∈𝑆 min𝑠𝐵∈𝑆 𝑢𝐴(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠𝐵, 𝑠
∗) ≤ max𝑠𝐴∈𝑆 𝑢𝐴(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠𝐵, 𝑠
∗).
This inequality holds for any 𝑠𝐵. Thus,
max𝑠𝐴∈𝑆 min𝑠𝐵∈𝑆 𝑢𝐴(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠𝐵, 𝑠
∗) ≤ min𝑠𝐵∈𝑆 max𝑠𝐴∈𝑆 𝑢𝐴(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠𝐵, 𝑠
∗).
With (4), we obtain
max𝑠𝐴∈𝑆 min𝑠𝐵∈𝑆 𝑢𝐴(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠𝐵, 𝑠
∗) = min𝑠𝐵∈𝑆 max𝑠𝐴∈𝑆 𝑢𝐴(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠𝐵, 𝑠
∗). (5)
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(4) implies
max𝑠𝐴∈𝑆 min𝑠𝐵∈𝑆 𝑢𝐴(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠𝐵, 𝑠
∗) = max𝑠𝐴∈𝑆 𝑢𝐴(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠
∗, 𝑠∗),
and
min𝑠𝐵∈𝑆 max𝑠𝐴∈𝑆 𝑢𝐴(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠𝐵, 𝑠
∗) = min𝑠𝐵∈𝑆 𝑢𝐴(𝑠
∗, 𝑠𝐵, 𝑠∗).
From
min𝑠𝐵∈𝑆 𝑢𝐴(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠𝐵, 𝑠
∗) ≤ 𝑢𝐴(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠∗, 𝑠∗),
and
max𝑠𝐴∈𝑆 min𝑠𝐵∈𝑆 𝑢𝐴(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠𝐵, 𝑠
∗) = max𝑠𝐴∈𝑆 𝑢𝐴(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠
∗, 𝑠∗),
we have
argmax𝑠𝐴∈𝑆 min𝑠𝐵∈𝑆 𝑢𝐴(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠𝐵, 𝑠
∗) = argmax𝑠𝐴∈𝑆 𝑢𝐴(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠
∗, 𝑠∗) = 𝑠∗.
Also, from
max𝑠𝐴∈𝑆 𝑢𝐴(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠𝐵, 𝑠
∗) ≥ 𝑢𝐴(𝑠∗, 𝑠𝐵, 𝑠∗),
and
min𝑠𝐵∈𝑆 max𝑠𝐴∈𝑆 𝑢𝐴(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠𝐵, 𝑠
∗) = min𝑠𝐵∈𝑆 𝑢𝐴(𝑠
∗, 𝑠𝐵, 𝑠∗),
we get
argmin𝑠𝐵∈𝑆 max𝑠𝐴∈𝑆 𝑢𝐴(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠𝐵, 𝑠
∗) = argmin𝑠𝐵∈𝑆 𝑢𝐴(𝑠
∗, 𝑠𝐵, 𝑠∗) = 𝑠∗.
Therefore,
argmax𝑠𝐴∈𝑆 min𝑠𝐵∈𝑆 𝑢𝐴(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠𝐵, 𝑠
∗) = argmin𝑠𝐵∈𝑆 max𝑠𝐴∈𝑆 𝑢𝐴(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠𝐵, 𝑠
∗) = 𝑠∗. (6)
(5) and (6) are equivalent to Lemma 2. This result holds for Player B and Player C as well
as Player A.
Next we show the following theorem.
Theorem 2. Under Assumption 1, the modified version of Sion’s minimax theorem with the co-
incidence of the maximin strategy and the minimax strategy imply the existence of a symmetric
Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Let ̃𝑠 be a value of 𝑠𝐶 such that
̃𝑠 = argmax𝑠𝐴∈𝑆 min𝑠𝐵∈𝑆 𝑢𝐴(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠𝐵, ̃𝑠) = argmin𝑠𝐵∈𝑆 max𝑠𝐴∈𝑆 𝑢𝐴(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠𝐵, ̃𝑠).
Then, from Lemma 2 we have
max𝑠𝐴∈𝑆 min𝑠𝐵∈𝑆 𝑢𝐴(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠𝐵, ̃𝑠) = min𝑠𝐵∈𝑆 𝑢𝐴( ̃𝑠, 𝑠𝐵, ̃𝑠) = min𝑠𝐵∈𝑆 max𝑠𝐴∈𝑆 𝑢𝐴(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠𝐵, ̃𝑠) = max𝑠𝐴∈𝑆 𝑢𝐴(𝑠𝐴, ̃𝑠, ̃𝑠).
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Since
𝑢𝐴( ̃𝑠, 𝑠𝐵, ̃𝑠) ≤ max𝑠𝐴∈𝑆 𝑢𝐴(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠𝐵, ̃𝑠),
and
min𝑠𝐵∈𝑆 𝑢𝐴( ̃𝑠, 𝑠𝐵, ̃𝑠) = min𝑠𝐵∈𝑆 max𝑠𝐴∈𝑆 𝑢𝐴(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠𝐵, ̃𝑠),
we get
argmin𝑠𝐵∈𝑆 𝑢𝐴( ̃𝑠, 𝑠𝐵, ̃𝑠) = argmin𝑠𝐵∈𝑆 max𝑠𝐴∈𝑆 𝑢𝐴(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠𝐵, ̃𝑠) = ̃𝑠.
Also, since
𝑢𝐴(𝑠𝐴, ̃𝑠, ̃𝑠) ≥ min𝑠𝐵∈𝑆 𝑢𝐴(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠𝐵, ̃𝑠),
and
max𝑠𝐴∈𝑆 𝑢𝐴(𝑠𝐴, ̃𝑠, ̃𝑠) = max𝑠𝐴∈𝑆 min𝑠𝐵∈𝑆 𝑢𝐴(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠𝐵, ̃𝑠),
we obtain
argmax𝑠𝐴∈𝑆 𝑢𝐴(𝑠𝐴, ̃𝑠, ̃𝑠) = argmax𝑠𝐴∈𝑆 min𝑠𝐵∈𝑆 𝑢𝐴(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠𝐵, ̃𝑠) = ̃𝑠.
Therefore,
𝑢𝐴( ̃𝑠, 𝑠𝐵, ̃𝑠) ≥ 𝑢𝐴( ̃𝑠, ̃𝑠, ̃𝑠) ≥ 𝑢𝐴(𝑠𝐴, ̃𝑠, ̃𝑠),
and so (𝑠𝐴, 𝑠𝐵, 𝑠𝐶) = ( ̃𝑠, ̃𝑠, ̃𝑠) is a symmetric Nash equilibrium of a three-players zero-sum
game.
4 Note on the case where Assumption 1 is not assumed.
Let 𝑠𝐶 = 𝑠, and define
̄𝑠 = argmax𝑠𝐴∈𝑆 min𝑠𝐵∈𝑆 𝑢𝐴(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠𝐵, 𝑠),
𝑠1 = argmin𝑠𝐵∈𝑆 max𝑠𝐴∈𝑆 𝑢𝐴(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠𝐵, 𝑠).
Let ̄𝑠 be the fixed point of the following function;
𝑠 → ̄𝑠(𝑠).
Then, by (2)
max𝑠𝐴∈𝑆 min𝑠𝐵∈𝑆 𝑢𝐴(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠𝐵, ̄𝑠) = min𝑠𝐵∈𝑆 𝑢𝐴( ̄𝑠, 𝑠𝐵, ̄𝑠) = min𝑠𝐵∈𝑆 max𝑠𝐴∈𝑆 𝑢𝐴(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠𝐵, ̄𝑠).
Since
max𝑠𝐴∈𝑆 𝑢𝐴(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠𝐵, ̄𝑠) ≥ 𝑢𝐴( ̄𝑠, 𝑠𝐵, ̄𝑠),
and
min𝑠𝐵∈𝑆 max𝑠𝐴∈𝑆 𝑢𝐴(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠𝐵, ̄𝑠) = min𝑠𝐵∈𝑆 𝑢𝐴( ̄𝑠, 𝑠𝐵, ̄𝑠),
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we have
argmin𝑠𝐵∈𝑆 max𝑠𝐴∈𝑆 𝑢𝐴(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠𝐵, ̄𝑠) = argmin𝑠𝐵∈𝑆 𝑢𝐴( ̄𝑠, 𝑠𝐵, ̄𝑠) = 𝑠
1.
Then,
min𝑠𝐵∈𝑆 max𝑠𝐴∈𝑆 𝑢𝐴(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠𝐵, ̄𝑠) = max𝑠𝐴∈𝑆 𝑢𝐴(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠
1, ̄𝑠).
Since
min𝑠𝐵∈𝑆 𝑢𝐴(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠𝐵, ̄𝑠) ≤ 𝑢𝐴(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠
1, ̄𝑠),
and
max𝑠𝐴∈𝑆 min𝑠𝐵∈𝑆 𝑢𝐴(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠𝐵, ̄𝑠) = max𝑠𝐴∈𝑆 𝑢𝐴(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠
1, ̄𝑠),
we have
argmax𝑠𝐴∈𝑆 min𝑠𝐵∈𝑆 𝑢𝐴(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠𝐵, ̄𝑠) = argmax𝑠𝐴∈𝑆 𝑢𝐴(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠
1, ̄𝑠) = ̄𝑠. (7)
Because the game is symmetric and zero-sum,
𝑢𝐴( ̄𝑠, 𝑠𝐵, ̄𝑠) + 𝑢𝐵( ̄𝑠, 𝑠𝐵, ̄𝑠) + 𝑢𝐶( ̄𝑠, 𝑠𝐵, ̄𝑠) = 0,
implies
2𝑢𝐴( ̄𝑠, 𝑠𝐵, ̄𝑠) + 𝑢𝐵( ̄𝑠, 𝑠𝐵, ̄𝑠) = 0.
Thus,
2𝑢𝐴( ̄𝑠, 𝑠𝐵, ̄𝑠) = −𝑢𝐵( ̄𝑠, 𝑠𝐵, ̄𝑠),
and so
argmin𝑠𝐵∈𝑆 𝑢𝐴( ̄𝑠, 𝑠𝐵, ̄𝑠) = argmax𝑠𝐵∈𝑆 𝑢𝐵( ̄𝑠, 𝑠𝐵, ̄𝑠) = 𝑠
1. (8)
Therefore, if 𝑠1 ≠ ̄𝑠, there may exist an asymmetric Nash equilibrium denoted as follows.
( ̄𝑠, 𝑠1, ̄𝑠)
In which only 𝑠𝐵 = 𝑠1.
5 Concluding Remark
In this paper we have shown that a modified version of Sion’s minimax theorem with the
coincidence of the maximin strategy and the minimax strategy is equivalent to the existence
of a symmetric Nash equilibrium in a symmetric three-players zero-sum game. We want to
extend this result to more general multi-players zero-sum game.
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